MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: A Concept for Organization for Attack on VC Infrastructure

1. Achieving a concerted, sustained and effective attack against the VC infrastructure is primarily a problem of bringing about coordination, integration and radical improvement of basic programs already being conducted by the various U.S. components. A second and vitally essential purpose is to bring about corresponding integration and focus, at all levels (down to Districts) on the Vietnamese side.

2. We first recommend the creation of a joint Mission level committee, chaired by Deputy COMUSMACV (RD), and including senior intelligence and operations representatives from MACV, USA and ODC. Second, we recommend the creation of a small joint civilian/military operations staff (a "command post") at the Saigon level supporting Deputy COMUSMACV (RD) and reporting directly to him, and corresponding infrastructure intelligence and operations coordinating elements at Region (Corps) and Province (Sector). At each level, these American elements will be tasked to coordinate and focus attack on VC infrastructure, and to stimulate and vitally support the corresponding Vietnamese coordinating committees or analogous elements in attack on the infrastructure. The Province officers designated as coordinators will additionally be responsible for creation and operation of District Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers, in selected Districts.

3. For the Saigon infrastructure staff, we recommend a Director and Deputy Director and Executive Secretariat, and three sections or groups, one for operations, a reports management group, and a small intelligence group.

4. The operating group of the Saigon staff will be built around three senior and experienced officers, each of whom will be responsible for the review, coordination, guidance and corrective action of the activities and performance of the several components, as they relate to a specifically defined problem area. This review,
coordination and guidance will be exercised not only at Saigon level, but also at each echelon, down to District (for selected Districts), working through established lines of command and through technical specialist channels, as appropriate.

5. Initially, we identify three problem areas, where such program managers (or program coordinators) plus supporting staff should be designated:

a. Intelligence collection programs, their coordination, and reaction operations.

b. Screening, detention and judicial processing of Viet Cong civil defendants.

c. Interrogation exploitation of the several components, VC captive and defectors.

6. These action and coordination officers will not only receive information from, and consult with the various components at Saigon level, but will also establish the data requirements for a system of monthly and other reports from all echelons down to Province (Sector).

7. A second "core element" of the Saigon staff is a Reports Management Group. This group, composed of reporting and information specialists, will design and manage a centrally administered reporting and analysis system. They will assist the Program Officers in developing reports to be required from Region and Province, they will develop for the staff as a whole a management information system, and they will process, analyze, and prepare reports of a routine and statistical nature, as a part of the management control system. Finally, they will undertake on behalf of the staff, a comprehensive, long-range information systems analysis of all of the various intelligence collection and reporting systems presently operating in Vietnam, as related to the attack on the infrastructure. In particular, they will make recommendations as to the fullest joint use of the very excellent MACV ADP systems, in the infrastructure attack.

8. The third and final component of the Saigon staff will be a very small Intelligence Group. Officers of this group are principally senior liaison officers with various intelligence analysis and production elements, and will prepare briefings, investigate special problems on behalf of the staff, and will especially concern themselves with the problem of intelligence evaluation of effectiveness of our attack on the VC infrastructure.
Field Organization

9. At Region (Corps), we recommend the designation of the OSA Regional Officer in Charge (ROIC), as the principal staff officer and coordinator to Senior Corps Advisor on matters relating to intelligence collection and action concerning VC infrastructure. Under the authority of the Senior Corps Advisor, the ROIC will convene and chair a committee composed of the Corps Senior Intelligence adviser and the heads of all principal American elements concerned with infrastructure (CRD, CI Detachments, 149th MI Group, OSA). The ROIC will serve as a principal point of contact for the Saigon operations staff. He will, with the committee, coordinate collection programs and review effectiveness of collection and action machinery. The ROIC, as principal staff officer to Senior Corps Advisor for Infrastructure, will recommend and generate operations for attack on infrastructure.

10. A further and highest priority task of the Corps Infrastructure Committee and the ROIC will be to stimulate and vitatize the counterpart Vietnamese Corps Intelligence Coordinating Committee, in order to focus their attention on infrastructure attack and to stimulate Vietnamese inter-agency cooperation and coordination.

11. At Province (Sector), we recommend the designation of one officer as principal staff officer to the Senior Sector advisor, for intelligence and action coordination relative to the attack on infrastructure. This officer may be provided by OSA or by CRD, as appropriate. He will coordinate collection programs, timely dissemination of information, and recommend reaction operations. He will serve as principal point of contact for Corps and Saigon Staff with respect to intelligence and action against infrastructure. He will, as a principal and priority task, stimulate and vitatize the Vietnamese Province Intelligence Coordinating Committee, and with his American colleagues, attempt to obtain Vietnamese agency participation and cooperation in proper functioning of this committee and in focusing it on infrastructure. The American team, under the chairmanship of the principal officer, will seek a clear definition of function of the Vietnamese side, with the ROIC to be the focal point for all combat intelligence, and the Police Special Branch as the focal point, in Province, for all infrastructure intelligence.

12. A further and highest priority task of the Infrastructure Coordinator at Province (Sector), will be the creation and supervision of operations of District Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers, in selected Districts. These DOIICC's will be combined American/Vietnamese centers tasked with achieving rapid evaluation, dissemination and immediate reaction operations targeted at destroying local VC infrastructure.